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 On 3 September 2014, almost six years since Chinese warships first entered the Gulf of Aden to fulfill antipiracy duties, China Central Television 
(CCTV)–8 aired the first episode of “In the Gulf of Aden” (舰在亚丁湾)�1 The 
multidozen-episode program, designed to “ignite raging patriotism” (燃起熊
熊爱国心), given evening prime-time status, and attracting a popular audi-
ence with a star-studded cast, explores in dramatic fashion Beijing’s experience 
fighting modern piracy� Produced by the People’s 
Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Political Depart-
ment’s Television Art Center (海军政治部电视艺
术中心) over three years, the series offers a unique 
window into how the PLAN has conducted its 
antipiracy mission and seeks to portray its experi-
ence to a Chinese audience�
In the first episode’s action-packed begin-
ning, PLAN Vessel 168 deploys special forces by 
helicopter to repel Somali pirates boarding the 
crippled China Ocean Shipping (Group) Company 
vessel Zhanshan� Meanwhile, Electro-Mechanical 
Branch squad leader Sun Weimin helps fix the 
ship’s stalled engine, enabling it to rejoin the es-
cort formation�2 Political commissar Xiao Weiguo 
subsequently grants Sun a twenty-minute phone 
call home—twice his previous allocation� Later 
episodes intersperse the glories of Gulf of Aden 
operations with the privations of being away from 
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families, who are separated from service members by thousands of miles and 
by limitations in information transmission�3 Gripping scenes portray PLAN 
personnel constantly checking food quality, averting phytosanitary disaster by 
switching in-port suppliers, refueling under way, weathering storms, exercising 
with foreign navies and receiving their officers aboard, adjusting plans rapidly to 
handle unexpected challenges, using special weapons and techniques to dispel 
pirates nonlethally, saving wounded merchant seamen with emergency medical 
treatment, and receiving gratitude from domestic and foreign ships they protect�
While some aspects of helicopter operations, weapons firing, and special 
forces engagement with pirates appear embellished for cinematic effect, the series 
uses real PLAN personnel and PLAN and civilian ships�4 Many details match 
realistic documentation in China’s state and military media� Human experiences 
are personified uniquely—as when a PLAN marine, Fang Xiaoba, pays respects 
at the grave of his father, who died rendering medical assistance in Tanzania—but 
collectively represent actual struggles and triumphs of sailors and families� A few 
scenarios exceed actual events to date� Most prominently, on a small forested 
island off Somalia, Team Leader Mao Dahua leads his special forces in a sixteen-
hour battle replete with exchanges of fire to evacuate thirteen Taiwanese fisher-
men cornered by pirates�5 Yet such heroics are not utterly fanciful and might well 
foreshadow future PLAN operations� 
Beyond simply serving as a blockbuster image engaging domestic dreams of a 
strong military, however, since 2008 China’s antipiracy escorts have provided im-
portant soft-power benefits for Beijing on a truly international stage� For the first 
time in its modern history China has deployed naval forces operationally beyond 
its immediate maritime periphery for extended durations, to protect merchant 
vessels from pirates in the Gulf of Aden� Over a six-year span beginning in De-
cember 2008, China has contributed over ten thousand navy personnel in nearly 
twenty task forces� In nearly eight hundred groups, these forces have escorted 
over six thousand Chinese and foreign commercial vessels and have “protected 
and helped over 60” of them�6 As the PLAN’s commander, Admiral Wu Shengli, 
informed one of the authors, the mission has achieved “two ‘100 percents’ [两个
百分之百]: providing 100 percent security to all ships under escort, while ensur-
ing PLAN forces’ own security 100 percent�”7
Although it is uncertain how many task forces will be deployed and for how 
long, China’s presence in the Gulf of Aden has extended through 2014, and the 
PLAN appears almost certain to continue efforts through 2015;8 it will likely 
persist for still longer if the United Nations further extends its mandate for na-
vies to fight piracy off Somalia�9 The probability of this is arguably even higher 
following the announcement in late 2014 that East Asian rival Japan’s Maritime 
Self-Defense Force will soon take command of a major international antipiracy 
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coalition� While Admiral Wu acknowledges that new piracy challenges have 
emerged in the Gulf of Guinea, “a concerning trend for all world navies,” he nev-
ertheless maintains, “As long as Gulf of Aden pirate activities continue, so too will 
the escort missions of international navies�” Six years ago, under United Nations 
authorization, China began to dispatch antipiracy task forces to the Gulf of Aden� 
At the beginning, China planned for only one year of antipiracy operations� This 
period was then extended for another year, and another, and so on� “So far,” Wu 
declared, “there is no end in sight for the mission�”10
China’s naval antipiracy mission represents an unprecedented instance of 
conduct by the PLAN of sustained long-distance operations� It provides a rare 
window through which outside observers can see how the naval component of 
China’s “going out” strategy transects economic, political, and strategic dimen-
sions� While many of China’s other maritime activities damage its international 
image, antipiracy operations in the far seas project soft power and a constructive 
image� Likely in part because of this positive publicity potential, Beijing has dis-
tributed copious details on its antipiracy operations via official media, including 
in English�11
The Chinese navy’s antipiracy missions provide much-needed support for 
Chinese overseas interests� But the PLAN has also crafted its antipiracy missions 
to portray blue-water operations positively abroad� Increasingly, the PLAN’s 
antipiracy mandate is oriented toward broader international security objectives� 
Commercial escort statistics exemplify this trend: initially China’s navy was only 
allowed to escort Chinese-flagged ships through the Gulf of Aden, but now in 
some cases over 70 percent of ships in given Chinese escort flotillas have been 
foreign flagged� Similarly, to secure the maritime commons Chinese command-
ing officers and sailors serving off Somalia have worked increasingly in the 
framework of bilateral exchanges with other navies as well as in multistakeholder 
settings� 
This article explores the soft-power dimension of China’s far-seas antipiracy 
operations� It addresses the extent to which Gulf of Aden deployments might 
increase the PLAN’s prospects for cooperation with other navies and also the 
impact of these missions on the role the navy plays within China’s larger diplo-
macy� Finally, it assesses how these deployments might shape future Chinese 
naval development� 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
A sharp increase in piracy attacks off Somalia threatened to interfere with 
China’s foreign trade� Several well-publicized pirate attacks prior to the PLAN’s 
antipiracy deployment in 2008 demonstrated Chinese vulnerability� Tianyu 8, a 
fishing boat with twenty-four crewmen; the Chinese tanker Zhenhua 4; and the 
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Sinotrans-owned cargo ship Dajian—as well as two Hong Kong–registered ships, 
Stolt Valor and Delight—were all pirated prior to the PLAN’s deployment�12 Over 
1,200 Chinese merchant vessels transited the Gulf of Aden during the first eleven 
months of 2008, and of this number eighty-three were attacked by pirate groups� 
Direct threats to China’s economic interests and citizens abroad were thus impor-
tant drivers of the PLAN’s first antipiracy deployment�
As the PLAN’s initial deployment prepared to set sail in December 2008, 
Senior Colonel Huang Xueping, Ministry of National Defense secondary spokes-
man and deputy director of the ministry’s Information Office, convened a news 
conference in which he clarified the points that, first, the mission’s primary 
objective was to protect Chinese shipping interests, and that, second, it did not 
represent a change in Chinese foreign policy or a desire to project greater blue-
water naval capabilities�13 Idealistic and realistic interpretations of China’s antipi-
racy operations differ greatly� The former focuses on China’s desire to contribute 
meaningfully to regional and international security, while the latter includes a 
“desire to protect Chinese shipping, expand China’s influence, and to provide 
opportunities for realistic training that will enhance the PLAN’s capabilities in 
military operations other than war�”14 
In line with the realists, economic interests in the Gulf of Aden had perhaps 
the greatest impact on pragmatic Chinese policy makers� As Foreign Ministry 
spokesman Liu Jianchao explains, “Piracy has become a serious threat to ship-
ping, trade and safety on the seas� � � � That’s why we decided to send naval ships 
to crack down�”15 China’s overseas maritime trade is highly dependent on vulner-
able sea lines of communication (SLOCs), such as the Bab el Mandeb, Strait of 
Hormuz, Indian Ocean, Strait of Malacca, Strait of Singapore, and South China 
Sea� China currently relies on just five SLOCs for roughly 90 percent of its over-
seas trade� In particular, approximately 60 percent of all commercial vessels that 
transit through the Strait of Malacca are Chinese flagged�16 
For China, therefore, the economic benefits of protecting its international 
trade are abundantly clear� China’s leadership continues to emphasize the PLAN’s 
imperative to secure Chinese overseas maritime interests� Specifically, energy 
supplies transported via international SLOCs will constitute a larger percentage 
of China’s aggregate energy consumption� Having become a net oil importer in 
1993, for example, China now relies on seaborne oil imports for over 40 percent 
of its oil consumption�17 China’s oil import dependence will rise substantially 
between now and 2030, by some estimates to as high as 80 percent�18 
Oil and other energy imports constitute just one of many sectors in China that 
face growing dependence on the sea� China Daily reported that as early as 2006, 
maritime industries accounted for $270 billion in economic output, nearly 10 
percent of China’s gross domestic product�19 In 2009, over 260 companies, across 
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various industries, reportedly engaged in international maritime shipping�20 
In 2010 it was reported that each year over two thousand Chinese commercial 
vessels were transiting the Gulf of Aden�21 In 2011, more than two years after 
the PLAN’s first antipiracy deployment, a professor at China’s National Defense 
University observed, “From the current situation, ocean lifelines have already 
become a soft rib in China’s strategic security�”22
China’s growth as a sea power has been rapid� It currently has more seafarers, 
deep-sea fleets, and ocean fishing vessels than any other nation� It has become, 
in the words of Ju Chengzhi, of the Ministry of Transport, a “great maritime 
shipping power” (海运大国)� In 2009 China’s merchant maritime fleet report-
edly consisted of over 3,300 vessels and forty thousand crewmen�23 People’s Daily 
reported in 2011 that China surpassed South Korea as the world’s largest ship-
builder in terms of capacity and new orders�24 China’s maritime responsibilities 
are huge, since it has thirty-two thousand kilometers of coastline and claims over 
three million square kilometers of offshore waters�25 
Public awareness of the importance of maritime issues is increasing� In 2008, 
two Chinese media outlets reported separate public surveys in which 86 percent 
and 91 percent of Chinese citizens polled supported the PLAN’s antipiracy de-
ployment�26 Simultaneously, many Chinese “netizens” (frequent Internet users) 
criticized their government for its inability to ensure Chinese sailors’ safety�27 
Domestically, in the period before deployments began Beijing thus faced strong 
political incentives to intervene decisively to protect its shipping� 
These political concerns at home paralleled international expectations� Such 
deployments, it was predicted, would enhance China’s image as a “responsible 
stakeholder” in international society, particularly in the domain of maritime 
security�28 In the years since, China’s antipiracy operations have already aided the 
PLAN substantially in developing its blue-water capacity� 
MILITARY DEVELOPMENT AND BLUE-WATER ASPIRATIONS
Beijing’s deployment of PLAN antipiracy forces appears to be spurring on Chi-
nese military development� As the Chinese newspaper Global Times puts it, over 
five years of deployments to the Gulf of Aden have transformed PLAN antipiracy 
forces from “maritime rookies to confident sea dogs�”29 Since China has not fought 
an actual war since its 1979 conflict with Vietnam, this experience of maintaining 
multiyear, distant deployments of warships is extremely valuable�30 It has brought 
PLAN vessels into what previously were—for China—literally uncharted waters� 
China’s Navy Press has had to perform “nautical chart support tasks” for the Gulf 
of Aden missions�31 In 2011, a PLAN senior captain effectively summarized the 
multidimensional benefits of distant sea antipiracy operations: “The experience 
definitely would be unprecedented not only for officers and sailors, but also for 
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the durability and function of the ships�”32 Some of the PLAN’s most advanced 
ships and personnel have gained valuable experience in the Gulf of Aden, and 
officers serving with distinction there have enjoyed subsequent promotions�33
Furthermore, antipiracy operations have positioned the PLAN as China’s most 
active service� By proving its effectiveness against threats to Chinese overseas 
interests, the PLAN has ensured that it will continue to procure some of the mili-
tary’s newest and best technology�34 More broadly, the persistent threat of piracy 
in international waters has enabled China to expand its far-seas security opera-
tions under the umbrella of benign international cooperation�35 
Close analysis of PLAN antipiracy activities reveals four primary conduits for 
projecting soft power: the escort of commercial ships and other direct opera-
tional aspects of PLAN antipiracy missions; navy-to-navy meetings, combined 
training, and other exchanges and instances of cooperation with foreign navies; 
participation in multistakeholder dialogues on land and at sea related to interna-
tional antipiracy operations; and, perhaps most significantly, a growing number 
of port visits conducted by PLAN warships for replenishment and diplomatic 
purposes before, during, and after service in the Gulf of Aden� Exploiting these 
channels has positioned the PLAN as an important and highly visible player in 
China’s comprehensive quest for international soft power� 
Antipiracy services provided by the PLAN to commercial ships have primar-
ily included area patrols, escorts, and on-ship protection�36 Wang Yongxiang, 
deputy commander of the tenth escort task force, explains that specific tactics 
depend on multiple idiosyncratic factors: “the schedules of the merchant vessels 
to be escorted, their characteristics, and how well our warships have rested� We 
want to not only ensure the safety of our charges, but also improve the efficiency 
of escort protection�”37 Area patrol—monitoring certain maritime zones in and 
around the Gulf of Aden—is the approach least employed by the PLAN� When 
China’s navy does engage in area patrols, it typically maintains two base points 
550–600 nautical miles apart—for example, one a hundred nautical miles north 
of Yemen’s Socotra Island and the other seventy-five nautical miles southwest of 
Aden Harbor�38 On a normal mission PLAN vessels travel between these points, 
typically taking two to three days to do so�39 
Of all the services provided by China’s antipiracy forces, the escort of civilian 
ships is the most common; it has become a daily practice for PLAN task forces in 
the Gulf of Aden� Task forces consist of two warships, usually a combination of 
destroyers and frigates� They are typically accompanied by either a replenishment 
or landing ship� However, since the first task force, two or more warships concur-
rently stationed in the Gulf of Aden have led separate flotillas of merchant ships, 
sometimes in opposite directions, through an area west of longitude fifty-seven 
east and south of latitude fifteen north�40
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PLAN escort efficiency has improved significantly since 2008� As a 2010 Lib-
eration Army Daily article states, “From the first escort to the escort of the 1,000th 
ship the Chinese naval task force used over 300 days, from the 1,000th to the 
2,000th ship used over 220 days, and from the 2,000th to the 3,000th ship only 
used over 180 days’ time�”41 As early as 2011, approximately 70 percent of ships 
escorted by China’s navy at any given time were foreign�42 In terms of aggregate 
escorts over the first four years, roughly 50 percent of PLAN-escorted commer-
cial vessels were foreign flagged�43 People’s Navy reported in mid-2011 that China 
had provided escort services to ships from over fifty foreign countries, and this 
figure has likely increased over the past three-plus years�44 People’s Daily empha-
sizes that escort services are provided gratis for Chinese and foreign commercial 
ships�45 That is, PLAN escort services are being provided as a complimentary 
public good to the international community� 
Foreign civilian ships can apply online to join a PLAN escort convoy via the 
China Shipowners’ Association website� Zhai Dequan, deputy secretary-general 
of the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association, has asserted, “China 
shoulders responsibility for foreign vessels based on growing national strength 
and a friendly policy”; many other states do not send escort forces, because of 
limited interest and the enormous costs� In Zhai’s opinion, “such international 
cooperation and exchanges also help the rest of the world to know more about 
China and accept it�”46 
Given the international context in which China’s antipiracy operations take 
place, the PLAN has taken steps to professionalize its services� For example, the 
use of the English language is important while conducting international opera-
tions; the twelfth task force had an on-duty translator on board the frigate Yiyang 
to liaise with foreign naval and merchant counterparts�47 Each PLAN task-force 
member receives four “pocket books” covering the psychological aspects of de-
ployment, security, international law, and the application of international law to 
military operations� Also, naval officers specializing in international law provide 
full-time legal support to officers and crews in meetings with ships of other na-
tions�48 These efforts have assisted China’s internavy exchanges�
INTERNAVY EXCHANGES AND DIALOGUES AT SEA
Chinese and international commentators greatly value the unprecedented ex-
posure of PLAN vessels and crews to foreign navies�49 Rear Admiral Michael 
McDevitt, USN (Ret�), articulates the historical significance of the PLAN’s de-
ployments in this way: “In terms of international engagement, the first de cade of 
the 21st century should be divided into a pre–anti-piracy operations period and 
a post-anti-piracy period, because once the PLAN began to conduct anti-piracy 
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operations, the entire nature of its approach to international naval engagement 
changed appreciably�”50 
The missions have had an undeniable impact on Chinese naval diplomacy; 
interaction with foreign navies that was novel in 2008 is now routine in the Gulf 
of Aden and adjacent waterways� In just a few of countless examples, in 2011 Han 
Xiaohu, commander of China’s eighth escort task force, visited in March the flag-
ship, a frigate, of NATO’s Operation OPEN SHIELD; in May, hosted the Singapore 
navy’s Rear Admiral Harris Chan, then commander of U�S�-led Combined Task 
Force (CTF) 151, on a PLAN warship; and in June hosted the European Union 
Naval Force (EU NAVFOR) commander on board the frigate Wenzhou�51 The 
PLAN and Singapore navy conducted bilateral exchanges in September 2010 
in the Gulf of Aden, sending personnel on board each other’s ships�52 A similar 
exchange occurred in those waters in June 2014�53 China’s navy conducted ad-
ditional exchanges with CTF-151 in July 2012 and with NATO in April and July 
2012�54 An article in People’s Daily stated in 2012 that Chinese naval escort task 
forces continue to inform the outside world about the “activities of suspicious 
ships through network mailbox and radio station every day and shared informa-
tion resources with 50-odd warships of 20-plus countries and organizations�”55 In 
July 2014, the PLAN’s seventeenth escort task force conducted the VENUS NO� 2 
joint antipiracy exercise with EU Combined Task Force 465 in the western Gulf of 
Aden� The guided-missile destroyer Changchun, the comprehensive supply ship 
Chaohu, and a Z-9 shipborne helicopter participated in task-force maneuvering, 
maritime replenishment, flashing-light signaling, and main gun antiship firing 
drills�56
China’s naval diplomacy in the region goes well beyond shipboard interactions 
with Western antipiracy forces� For example, PLAN task forces off the Horn of 
Africa have also been active in a variety of bilateral exchanges� The PLAN and 
the Russian navy executed joint antipiracy escorts for the first time in October 
2009, during the PEACE BLUE SHIELD 2009 (平蓝盾—2009) exercise�57 Similarly, 
China’s navy held extensive joint exercises with Russian navy BLUE SHIELD units 
in May 2011 and conducted similar antipiracy joint exercises in both 2012 and 
2013�58 Amid comprehensive Sino-Russian joint maritime exercises in 2012, Chi-
nese and Russian naval forces performed extensive piracy-deterrence and rescue 
joint training off the coast of Qingdao�59 
The Chinese navy is not interacting only with large navies� During November 
2009, PLAN military officials met with Dutch counterparts to perform on-ship 
inspections and exchanges, and during 2010 PLAN forces collaborated with 
South Korean naval units in antipiracy exercises in the Gulf of Aden�60 In 2012, 
China and South Korea conducted joint antipiracy exercises in which helicop-
ters of the two sides landed on each other’s warships for the first time�61 In April 
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2011, China’s eighth escort task force sent Wenzhou and Qiandaohu to conduct 
joint antipiracy exercises with the Pakistani guided-missile destroyer Khyber�62 
These combined drills followed the Pakistani-hosted PEACE 11 multinational 
maritime exercises, which included naval ships from, among other states, China, 
the United States, Britain, France, Japan, and Pakistan� China sent guided-missile 
frigates Wenzhou and Ma’anshan, two helicopters, and seventy special forces 
commandos�63 More recently the PLAN conducted joint antipiracy training with 
the Ukrainian navy in the Gulf of Aden� All of these efforts support China’s grow-
ing naval diplomacy�
CHINESE NAVAL DIPLOMACY
At-sea engagements with other navies are crucial for establishing a positive image 
of China’s growing global maritime presence� These engagements are comple-
mented by a growing focus by the PLAN on establishing effective relationships 
with littoral states in and adjacent to the Indian Ocean region� Indeed, since 
2008 the nature and scope of Chinese naval visits have expanded continuously� 
Growing port calls bolster China’s far-seas soft-power projection by facilitating 
interaction and dialogue between China and the many countries whose ports and 
geographic locations heighten the strategic value of these relationships� 
The PLAN is increasing port visits (see the table) as its far-seas antipiracy 
presence matures� A small sample reveals the dynamism with which the PLAN 
is engaging the navies, governments, and citizens of littoral states in connec-
tion with its antipiracy missions� For example, during September 2012, Yiyang 
of the twelfth escort task force arrived in Karachi for a second cycle of rest and 
replenishment, during which it held seminars and other exchanges with Pakistani 
naval counterparts�64 Later that year Rear Admiral Zhou Xuming and members 
from the twelfth escort task force met with Commodore Jonathan Mead, acting 
commander of the Australian Fleet, in Sydney on an official visit� The Australian 
chief of navy, Vice Admiral Ray Griggs, remarked, “I welcome the continued op-
portunity for our navies to share their experiences today as we exchange lessons 
learned in the conduct of counter-piracy operations�”65 More recently, in late 2013 
the fifteenth escort task force, in addition to holding friendly exchanges with 
fleets from the EU, United States, and NATO, docked for friendly visits in Tanza-
nia, Kenya, and Sri Lanka�66 The sixteenth task force conducted antipiracy duties 
and dispatched the guided-missile frigate Yancheng to escort Syrian chemical 
weapons to their destruction;67 it then “paid consecutive visits to eight African 
countries for the first time�”68 It conducted antipiracy exercises with the navies of 
several of those countries, including Cameroon, Namibia, and Nigeria�69
Clearly, uninterrupted operations in the Gulf of Aden have helped to facilitate 
PLAN maritime engagement with other countries in the vicinity as well as those 
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strategically situated on the route from China to Somali waters� China has ef-
fectively increased the role of naval diplomacy as a component of its antipiracy 
deployments in a number of world regions� People’s Daily reports that “since 
the 2nd Chinese naval escort task force, the Chinese navy has established a new 
mechanism of organizing escort warships to pay friendly visits to foreign coun-
tries, and the Chinese naval escort task forces have successfully paid friendly vis-
its to more than 20 countries, such as India, Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE) and Singapore�”70 
Whereas in all of 2009, PLAN task forces berthed in foreign ports in just 
five states, Chinese antipiracy flotillas have, among them, stopped in over ten 
countries every year since 2010� Moreover, the nature of port calls has evolved 
dramatically during the past six years� In 2009 and 2010 most Chinese port calls 
were conducted for replenishment, rest, and relaxation� But by 2012 Chinese 
antipiracy escort task forces had begun making several port calls for friendly 
visits (i�e�, goodwill exchanges with diplomatic elements) before, during, and 
after their service in the Gulf of Aden� This trend has continued over the last two 
years and demonstrates a growing share of Chinese naval resources devoted to 
diplomacy� More importantly, it illustrates the efficiency with which the PLAN 
is deriving soft-power capital from its contributions to international maritime 
nontraditional security�
China has also bolstered international exchanges by hosting foreign navies at 
Chinese ports and cities� In mid-May 2011 China invited twenty representatives 
from eight African nations, including Algeria, Cameroon, and Gabon, to partici-
pate in a twenty-day maritime law enforcement program in Zhejiang Province�71 
At the first International Symposium on Counter-Piracy and Escort Coopera-
tion, in February 2012 at the PLAN Command College in Nanjing, Navy Military 
Studies Research Institute senior researcher Cai Weidong stated, “The Chinese 
navy hopes to build up a platform for international cooperation that will allow 
naval forces of different countries to familiarize themselves with each other� I 
hope the platform well serves our antipiracy goals�”72 
As these examples illustrate, China has derived incrementally greater soft-
power benefits from its antipiracy operations by boosting the number of both 
midmission port calls and goodwill visits en route home� Chinese scholar Wang 
Yizhou has called for a higher degree of “creative involvement,” a foreign policy 
concept that identifies and adapts creative and flexible modes of foreign engage-
ment on a case-by-case basis�73 The PLAN seems to be applying Wang’s concept 
in the far seas, perhaps most notably through its antipiracy operations, without 
changing their fundamental form� Adding more stops before and after antipiracy 
service in the Gulf of Aden has allowed the PLAN to accumulate larger soft-power 
gains� This practice reflects the PLAN’s greatest lesson from far-seas antipiracy 
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 ALGERIA
Algiers
• 2–5 April 2013, friendly visit
AUSTRALIA
Sydney
• 18–22 December 2012, friendly 
visit
BAHRAIN
Manama
• 9–13 December 2010, friendly 
visit
BULGARIA
Varna
• 6–10 August 2012, friendly visit
BURMA
Rangoon
• 29 August–2 September 2010, 
friendly visit
DJIBOUTI
Djibouti 
• 24 January 2010, replenish/ 
overhaul
• 3 May 2010, replenish/ 
overhaul
• 13 September 2010, replenish/
overhaul
• 22 September 2010, replenish/
overhaul
• 24 December 2010, replenish/
overhaul
• 21 February 2011, replenish/ 
overhaul
• 5 October 2011, replenish/ 
overhaul
• 24–29 March 2012, replenish/
overhaul
• 14 May 2012, replenish/ 
overhaul
• 13–18 August 2012, replenish/
overhaul 
• 1–6 December 2012, replenish/
overhaul
• 6–8 June 2013, replenish/ 
overhaul
• 28 July 2013, replenish/ 
overhaul
• 7–9 October 2013, replenish/
overhaul
• 22–26 February 2014,  
replenish/overhaul
• 1–5 April 2014, replenish/ 
overhaul and friendly visit
EGYPT
Alexandria
• 26–30 July 2010, friendly visit
FRANCE
Toulon
• 23–27 April 2013, friendly visit
GREECE
Crete
• 7 March 2011, replenish/ 
overhaul
Piraeus
• 9–13 August 2013, friendly visit
INDIA
Cochin
• 8 August 2009, friendly visit
ISRAEL
Haifa
• 14–17 August 2012, friendly visit
ITALY
Taranto
• 2–7 August 2010, joint drills and 
friendly visit
KENYA
Mombasa
• 2–5 January 2014, friendly 
visit 
KUWAIT
Shuwaikh
• 27 November–1 December 2011, 
friendly visit
MALAYSIA
Port Kelang
• 6 December 2009, friendly visit
MALTA
• 26–30 March 2013, friendly visit
MOROCCO
Casablanca
• 9–13 April 2013, friendly visit
MOZAMBIQUE
Maputo
• 29 March–2 April 2012,  
friendly visit
OMAN
Masqat
• 1–8 December 2011, friendly visit
Salalah
• 21 June–1 July 2009, replenish/
overhaul
• 14 August 2009, replenish/ 
overhaul
• 2 January 2010, replenish/ 
overhaul
• 1 April 2010, replenish/ 
overhaul
• 8 June 2010, replenish/ 
overhaul
• 10 August 2010, replenish/ 
overhaul
• 8 January 2011, replenish/ 
overhaul
• 19 January 2011, replenish/ 
overhaul 
• 10 April 2011, replenish/ 
overhaul
• 8–11 June 2011, replenish/ 
overhaul
• 23 June 2011, replenish/ 
overhaul
• 7–10 November 2011,  
replenish/overhaul
• 21–24 February 2012,  
replenish/overhaul
• 1–3 July 2012, replenish/ 
overhaul 
• 9 July 2012, replenish/overhaul
• 28–29 March 2013, replenish/
overhaul
PAKISTAN
Karachi
• 5–8 August 2009, joint drills and 
friendly visit
• 7–13 March 2010, joint drills and 
friendly visit
• 13 March 2011, joint drills
• 8 September 2012, replenish/
overhaul
PHILIPPINES
Manila
• 13–17 April 2010, friendly visit
PORTUGAL
Lisbon
• 15–19 April 2013, friendly visit
QATAR
Doha
• 2–7 August 2011, friendly visit
ROMANIA
Constanţa
• 31 July–3 August 2012, friendly 
visit
SELECTED PORT VISITS BY PLAN ANTIPIRACY FORCES
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SAUDI ARABIA
Jidda
• 27 November–1 December 2010, 
friendly visit
• 3 September 2011, replenish/
overhaul
• 17 June 2012, replenish/ 
overhaul
• 1–6 January 2013, replenish/ 
overhaul
• 5–28 April 2013, replenish/ 
overhaul
• 14–18 September 2013,  
replenish/overhaul
• 2–6 November 2013,  
replenish/overhaul
SEYCHELLES
Port Victoria
• 14 April 2011, friendly visit
• 16–20 June 2013, friendly visit
SINGAPORE
Changi
• 5–7 September 2010, replenish/
overhaul and joint drills
• 18–20 December 2011, replenish/
overhaul and friendly visit
• 5–10 September 2013, friendly 
visit
SOUTH AFRICA
Durban
• 4–8 April 2011, friendly visit
SRI LANKA
Colombo
• 5–7 January 2010, friendly visit
• 7–12 December 2010, friendly 
visit
Trincomalee
• 13–15 January 2014, friendly visit
TANZANIA
Dar es Salaam
• 26–30 March 2011, joint drills 
and friendly visit
• 29 December 2013–1 January 
2014, friendly visit
THAILAND
Sattahip
• 16–21 August 2011, joint drills 
and friendly visit
• 21–25 April 2012, friendly visit
• 12–16 September 2013, friendly 
visit
TURKEY
Istanbul
• 5–8 August 2012, friendly visit
UKRAINE
Sevastopol
• 31 July–3 August 2012, friendly 
visit
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
Abu Dhabi
• 24–28 March 2010, friendly visit
VIETNAM
Ho Chi Minh City
• 13 January 2013, friendly visit
YEMEN
Aden
• 21 February 2009, replenish/
overhaul
• 25 April 2009, replenish/ 
overhaul
• 23 July 2009, replenish/ 
overhaul
• 28 September 2009, replenish/
overhaul
• 5 February 2010, replenish/ 
overhaul
• 16 May 2010, replenish/ 
overhaul
• 26 July 2010, replenish/ 
overhaul
• 1 October 2010, replenish/ 
overhaul
SELECTED PORT VISITS BY PLAN ANTIPIRACY FORCES CONTINUED
missions: there is no substitute for experience, and six years of continuous op-
erations have allowed China gradually to become more effective in securing its 
comprehensive interests through the deployment of antipiracy task forces�74
Arguably even more than foreign port calls, other nontraditional maritime 
security operations facilitated by Beijing’s Gulf of Aden antipiracy presence 
contribute to China’s “blue soft power�” Escort of foreign vessels carrying Syrian 
chemical weapons through the Mediterranean and active participation in search 
and rescue operations during the frantic search for Malaysian Airlines Flight 370 
in early 2014 are just two examples of how the PLAN has leveraged antipiracy 
resources to contribute to international security�75 
Some commentators are less sanguine about China’s attempts to expand its 
maritime relations; it is important to note that there are objections to the no-
tion that China’s antipiracy missions are benign� In that view, self-interested 
economic and security calculations are arguably the largest drivers of the PLAN’s 
deployment of warships to the Gulf of Aden, and viewing port visits as diplo-
matic exchanges risks oversimplification, since many states may view them as 
12
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harbingers of creeping Chinese power projection�76 For example, the tiny island-
state Seychelles is one of several coastal and island African states in which China 
has actively sought to enhance its soft power�77 China could be using antipiracy 
operations to support an expansive naval development policy, as well as to pursue 
a more active grand strategy that involves overseas access facilities and a long-
term trend toward a greater overall global presence�
CHINESE NAVAL DEVELOPMENT
The PLAN is just one of several “independent” providers of antipiracy assets in 
the Gulf of Aden� While the majority of naval antipiracy forces fight pirates under 
the aegis of multilateral commands, several states—including China, India, Iran, 
Japan, Malaysia, and Russia—have primarily operated on a unilateral basis rather 
than under the command of multinational antipiracy forces such as CTF-151, 
NATO’s Operation OPEN SHIELD, or EU NAVFOR� This posture suggests that 
China is trying to learn as much as it can from other navies without revealing 
much about its own operations, while also, clearly, maintaining ideological inde-
pendence in foreign policy�
China’s preference to abstain from combined operations is driven by several 
factors� First, greater independence allows the PLAN to conduct its preferred 
method of antipiracy operations—relatively low-risk escort operations aimed at 
deterring, rather than actively searching for, pirates� It also offers China an indi-
vidual identity as a provider of maritime public goods, rather than as just another 
state operating within Western-led security mechanisms� Moreover, if China 
joined the existing security structure, potential frictions might arise that would 
preclude meaningful integration, such as sensitivities related to information 
sharing and technology theft� Some Western defense experts have questioned the 
U�S� Navy’s invitation for the PLAN to participate in the historic 2014 RIMPAC 
exercises and other joint maritime cooperation activities for such reasons�78
These concerns notwithstanding, China’s antipiracy operations over the past 
several years have made meaningful contributions to Gulf of Aden security� In 
addition, they have achieved unprecedented coordination between China and 
other antipiracy maritime forces in the region, such as those of the United States� 
While suspicions abound regarding China’s motives, antipiracy cooperation may 
contribute to more positive outside perceptions of China and its international 
status� China has been “ready to exchange information and cooperate with the 
warships of other countries in fighting Somalian pirates” since its inaugural de-
ployment in 2008�79 One PLAN antipiracy task force commander, Admiral Du 
Jingcheng, has recalled that he was eager to “facilitate exchanges of information 
with escort naval vessels from other countries�”80 
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In the nearly six-year period beginning December 2008, the PLAN has co-
ordinated information with over twenty nations, including the United States�81 
Li Faxin, associate professor (and lieutenant commander) at the Naval Marine 
Corps College, states that PLAN antipiracy forces have established “high-trust 
partner relations” (高度信任的伙伴关系) with many nations operating in the 
Gulf of Aden�82 
Positive results have also been facilitated by Shared Awareness and Deconflic-
tion (SHADE), a voluntary multistate antipiracy information-sharing mecha-
nism� SHADE meetings occur quarterly in Bahrain and regularly host naval and 
industry leaders from various states� Willingness on the part of independent na-
vies, China’s in particular, to synchronize their antipiracy operations with those 
of Western forces within the SHADE mechanism is a historic achievement for 
twenty-first-century maritime commons governance� 
China was denied SHADE chairmanship in 2009 but, notwithstanding, coor-
dinates its antipiracy escorts with those of other SHADE members� For example, 
China has participated in SHADE’s Convoy Coordination Working Group and 
coordinates its monthly escort schedules with other navies providing indepen-
dent escorts� China, India, and Japan reportedly began coordinating their anti-
piracy operations as early as 2011�83 They mutually arranged escort schedules 
twenty-nine times between January and March 2012, with China acting as the 
coordinator for ten escorts, India for ten, and Japan for nine�84 
For six years the PLAN’s antipiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden have symbol-
ized China’s burgeoning out-of-area naval activity� They also showcase Beijing’s 
growing ability to achieve soft-power objectives while concurrently promoting 
its overseas interests and military development� Important components of these 
missions include escort of commercial ships, navy-to-navy meetings, participa-
tion in multistakeholder dialogues on antipiracy operations, and, most signifi-
cantly, the growing number of port visits undertaken by PLAN warships� These 
position the PLAN as an important and highly visible player in China’s recent 
soft-power diplomacy�
China’s ongoing antipiracy operations in the far seas have generated many 
positive assessments� In contrast to the contentious near seas, where Beijing is 
consistently embroiled in sovereignty disputes that show no signs of abating, 
antipiracy missions represent the most significant positive component of China’s 
naval engagement to date, particularly with regard to the degree to which Chi-
nese vessels and sailors are interacting with the outside world� This interaction 
not only enhances China’s maritime image in the eyes of its antipiracy partners 
but may help alleviate fears that China’s naval rise might one day threaten twenty-
first-century maritime prosperity in regions beyond the near seas� The United 
14
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States and China reportedly planned over forty visits, exchanges, and other en-
gagements for 2013, double the number in the previous year, and successfully car-
ried out joint antipiracy exercises in 2012 and 2013�85 In July–August 2014, China 
participated in RIMPAC for the first time, the U�S�-hosted forum that is currently 
the largest naval exercise in the world�86 There, four PLAN vessels drilled with 
international counterparts off Hawaii, on such subjects as antipiracy�87
China has received well-deserved credit for helping to reduce piracy dramati-
cally in the Gulf of Aden� In 2007–2008, as Admiral Wu told one of the authors, 
the area suffered about a hundred pirate attacks annually, of which between fifty 
and sixty “hijackings” (piratings) were successful� In 2014, by contrast, there were 
only seventeen attacks through September, none successful� China’s contribu-
tion entailed “major costs in forces, human resources, and money�” Admiral Wu 
continued, “The U�S� Navy and other top-level U�S� leaders are very happy that 
this is continuing� They are satisfied that China expends significant resources to 
make a contribution,” thereby reducing the resource burden on the United States� 
“There are just some members of Congress who remain opposed to the missions�” 
Admiral Wu added that he wants to invite U�S� congressional representatives to 
PLAN ships in the Gulf of Aden�88
The PLAN’s experience fighting piracy in distant seas is thus a benchmark 
that can be used by Beijing to cement its positive image in the international 
arena� Antipiracy operations prove that the PLAN can be a provider—not merely 
a consumer or, worse, a disrupter—of maritime commons security� Interna-
tional society largely perceives Chinese naval contributions to fighting piracy as 
positive developments, perceptions that stand in sharp contrast to China’s hard-
power naval approaches in the East and South China Seas� Scholars constantly 
scrutinize the nature and perceived efficacy of China’s soft power�89 While it is 
too early to speculate exactly how Beijing’s contributions to antipiracy today will 
bolster its future soft-power influence, the results should be at least moderately 
positive� More generally, the Gulf of Aden case suggests that China will continue 
to reap international political benefits commensurate with its contributions to 
international maritime security�
N O T E S
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September 2014, news�xinhuanet�com/� 
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beach and ferry individuals in five batches 
back to frigate Changzhou� 王志秋 [Wang 
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nese Naval Escort Taskforce Sets Sail,” China 
Military Online, 4 August 2014, eng�chinamil 
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